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Abstract
We analyze the relation of ￿rm performance and managerial turnover in 19th
century German banking by probit estimation. This period covers a major reform
of corporate governance. Before the reform performance and turnover are unrelated,
wheras after the reform more succesfull managers leave ￿rms more seldom. However,
only short run performance matters.
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The major concern of shareholders is that they do not receive the highest possible re-
turn on their investment since managers abuse ￿rm resources. The structure of owner-
manager relationships can be designed by shareholders and by legislators to reduce such
concerns. Ex ante, shareholders can o⁄er performance related payment schemes to newly
hired managers. Ex post, shareholders can monitor managers, after the contract with a
manager is sealed. If managerial misbehavior is detected, shareholders can replace the
agent. However, not all contracts between owners and managers are legal and enforce-
able. It depends on legal institutions what information principals are entitled to, what
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1their ability is to monitor and not the least what actual rights they have to dismiss a
manager.
This makes the historical perspective on managerial turnover with German data
for the time 1871-1913 in particular interesting. In general, pre-World-War-I data has
not been investigated so far, but it is informative to work with data from the German
Empire especially since the era covers a substantial reform of corporate governance.1
So our paper accompanies Burhop (2004a) and Bayer / Burhop (2004) who investigate
performance related remuneration of managers in 19th and early 20th century German
banking, and the in￿ uence of corporate law on this pay-performance relationship. These
papers show that managerial remuneration strongly depended on ￿rm performance and
that this relationship was tremendously in￿ uenced by a major legal reform in 1884,
which created the modern two-tier German board system. Similarly, the present paper
analyses the impact of the 1884 reform of the German corporate governance code on
executive turnover. Thus, the reform actually allows us to compare with each other two
historical corporate governance regimes within a￿ more or less￿ unchanged socioeconomic
setting.
For modern data, the relationship between managerial turnover and ￿rm performance
seems to be stable over time and between di⁄erent countries notwithstanding their ma-
jor di⁄erences in economic structure and corporate governance institutions. There is
widespread evidence that managerial turnover negatively depends on ￿rm performance:
successful managers are less likely to leave a ￿rm. Huson et al. (2001) present evidence
for the US,2 Conyon (1998) for the UK, Kaplan (1994a) for Japan, and Kaplan (1994b,
1995) as well as Franks / Meyer (2001) for Germany.
Comparing corporate governance systems and their outcomes over longer periods
of time can complement the inter-country comparisons of modern systems. Holderness
et al. (1999) analyze the change of corporate governance in the U.S. and ￿nd that by
and large corporate governance did not change very much between the 1930s and 1990s.
By contrast, Hadlock / Lumer (1997), report that internal monitoring of managers was
weaker during the 1930. We contribute by investigating the relationship between ￿rm
performance and managerial turnover under two di⁄erent historical corporate gover-
nance systems in 19th and early 20th century Germany. While we also ￿nd a negative
relationship between ￿rm performance and managerial turnover for the period after the
1See Guinnane (2002) for an overview of the history of the German banking system and Pohl (1981)
for a long-term perspective on corporate governance in Germany.
2Additionaly, Huson et al. (2001) investigate whether this result is time invariant by splitting the
period 1971-1994 in 4 subperiods. They do not ￿nd a signi￿cant change in the relationship between the
likelihood of forced CEO turnover and ￿rm performance.
2reform in 1884, there is almost no such relationship before the reform.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section II describes the
historical and legal background in late 19th and early 20th century Germany. Section
III presents our data sources and descriptive statistics. In the following Section IV, we
report the results of our econometric analysis. The ￿nal Section V concludes the paper.
2 Historical and institutional background
The foundation of the German Empire in 1871 was a turning point in Germany￿ s polit-
ical, social, and economic history. Parallel to the Empire￿ s political foundation, many
new economic institutions were set up, e.g. a liberal joint-stock companies act (1870-71),
a new, gold-based currency (1873-76), and the Reichsbank (1876). During the ￿Gr￿nder-
jahre￿ , a ￿new economy￿emerged in Germany, accompanied by a roaring stock market
and a company promotion boom, which was partly ￿nanced by the substantial French
war indemnity of 1871-73. This, jointly with the liberalisation of the joint-stock compa-
nies act in 1870, leads to a real boom in the numbers of new stock companies founded.
After the act basically every citizen could found a joint-stock company, whereas before a
royal concession was needed. Between 1870 and 1873 more than 900 corporations were
founded within three years and their stocks sold to investors.
A major shortcoming of the 1870 joint-stock company law was weak corporate gover-
nance. Theoretically the new law replaced the former state supervision of corporations
by the introduction of a two-tier board system with an executive board (Vorstand) and
a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), in which the shareholders should have been repre-
sented. In practice however, the clear separation of executive and supervisory board
could be and was avoided by several means and also the ￿rst members of the executive
and supervisory board were typically appointed by the company￿ s founder. Moreover,
shareholders were sometimes even excluded from the board￿ s election.
Additionally, the voting rights￿ and also the participation rights￿ of shareholders on
annual meetings could be restricted, and the publication of a pro￿t-loss statement was
not compulsory. In addition, the executive board was not responsible to act on behalf
of the shareholders or the company, but on behalf of the supervisory board. And ￿nally,
weak monitoring rights were aggravated by even weaker legal means to punish managerial
misbehavior.
The 1873 stock-market crash and the failure of many corporations triggered a dis-
cussion about the necessary corporate governance reform in Germany.3
3For example, the in￿ uential liberal Reichstag (parliament) member Tellkampf demanded to prohibit
joint-stock companies (Tellkampf 1876) completely.
3In 1884, a fundamental reform was ￿nally enacted. This new joint-stock companies
law introduced many fundamental features of the modern German corporate law. For
the ￿rst time, the new law strictly separated the functions of the supervisory and the
executive board. Since then, the supervisory board had to be elected by the shareholders,
and both boards were accountable to the shareholders. Moreover, the minimum face
value of shares was signi￿cantly increased and they had to be fully paid-up before quoted
on a stock-market. In addition, all shareholders got participation and voting rights on
the annual meeting, the publication of a pro￿t-loss statement and a balance sheet in the
o¢ cial government newspaper was prescribed. Finally, the penalties for misbehavior of
executive and supervisory board members were signi￿cantly increased (Ring 1890; Hopt
1980).
Although the e⁄ectiveness of the 1884 law was questioned by some contemporaries,
this discussion rather focussed on possible extensions of the reform, than on the general
direction of the reform itself (Warschauer 1902; Philippovich 1909). In general, the
reform was perceived as an improvement of corporate control and corporate governance
(Hessberger 1889, p 57). In fact, the reform was a success.
3 Data
Data source for this paper is Reitmayer (1999) which includes information about total
assets, dividends, share price, nominal share capital, and all executive board members
by name and years of board membership for 24 member banks of the Preu￿ enkonsortium
(bank consortium for the emission of Prussian government debt) for the years 1871 to
1914. Since a large number of the banks was actually only founded between 1870 and
1873, we restrict the data set to observations after 1874.
Although the market value is not explicitly included in Reitmeyer (1999) we can
compute it as the nominal value of issued capital times the share price. The dividend
yield, DY, we calculate as the dividend in year t relative to the price of a share at the
end of year t ￿ 1:4
The data on board members that we have contains all members of the board of
executives for each company. This allows to calculate the total number of members on
the board for each year for each company. Moreover, this tells us how long each board
member has been on the board up to the date when he leaves, which is also the date at
which we stop the observation for the particular board member.
4This dividend yield should highly correlate with the total return on equity since for the period under
study we know from Burhop (2004a) that the actual dividend and the current accounting pro￿t are
almost perfectly collinear.
4To account for the long-run performance of a board member we calculate the average
growth rate of total assets, GR, for each board member from the time he joined the com-
pany. Analogously we calculate the average dividend yield for each manager beginning
at the time that he joined the board of executives.
The observation of each manager begins the year after he joined and it ends the year
before he leaves. If a manager quits in the following period this is indicated by a dummy
variable. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish whether a board member left the board
voluntarily or whether his leave was forced.5 In total we have 2910 observations (i.e.
managers-board-membership-years), 570 of these fall in the period 1874-1883 and the
other 2340 observation in the later period 1884-1913.
Although the frequency of leave is larger (5.94%) in the latter period than in the for-
mer (4.73%), both subsamples do not di⁄er signi￿cantly with respect to the probability
of a manager leaving, see table 1. However, they do di⁄er in other respects: Both, the
dividend yield and the annual growth of share prices is on average larger between 1874
and 1883. Yet, the di⁄erence is only signi￿cant for the dividend yield.6 At the same time,
also the volatility of share-price growth and the volatility of dividends is much larger,
so that the higher yield on shares in the early period re￿ ects higher uncertainty before
1884. In line with this, also the frequency of ￿nancial distress indicated by a reduction
in the nominal share capital is much larger in the years before 1884. In summary, this
gives some ex ante indication that the reform in 1884 indeed reduced the risk of investors
by improving the set of corporate governance mechanisms available to them.7
4 Results
We conduct our analysis of the performance turnover relationship with the widest pos-
sible set of performance measures our data allows for. So we include the dividend yield
and the change in share price to account for short run performance. To account for the
long run, we include the average dividend yield since the manager enters the board, the
average growth rate of total assets since the manager joined and the average growth
rate of the share price. However, the share-price changes and the dividend yield are
substantially correlated, so that we cannot include both in a single regression. Also we
5However, we do not observe any manager moving from one ￿rm to the other.
6The risk-free interest rate, e.g. given by Prussian government bonds does not signi￿cantly di⁄er
between both subperiods, and hence the results still remains valid if we only focus on the yield spread
against these bonds.
7Though, a limitation of this data set should be noted. Ownership data are not included since such
data are generally unavailable for 19th century Germany. In view of the fact that studies for modern
Germany did not ￿nd a signi￿cant in￿ uence of ownership structure on managerial turnover, we expect
this limitation not to be crucial (Kaplan 1994b, p 155).
5Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (of binary choice) variables by subperiod
Variable Frequency p-val, di⁄erence
Manager leaves the board 1874-1883 0.0473
1884-1913 0.0594 0.118
Reduction of nominal capital 1874-1883 0.0877
1884-1913 0.0025 0










￿Mean and variance are calculated on the basis of 188 and 615 bank-years for both respective
sub-periods. P-values come from two sided t- and F-tests on the equality of mean and variance.
check for relative performance evaluation by including the average dividend yield over
all companies. To capture ￿rm size e⁄ects, we enter the number of board members and
the total value of assets in the estimation, for age e⁄ects we include the length of tenure
of a manager. Also, we include a dummy for a reduction of nominal capital to capture a
restructuring of the bank. Finally, we interact all performance regressors with a dummy
for the time period after the corporate governance reform in 1884. Table 2 presents the
results of a probit estimation.
In model 1 we use the dividend yield as a performance measure, whereas model 2
measures performance on the basis of share-price changes. The most striking result of
Table 2 is that almost all but the short-run performance measures are insigni￿cant even
at a 10% level. Short-run performance also only in￿ uences managerial turnover after
1884￿ at least when we draw inference using a 5% level of signi￿cance. After the reform
the better performance results in lower turnover. Besides short-run performance, the
only other factor that in￿ uences managerial turnover in our sample is the incidence of a
reduction of nominal capital, which indicates a ￿nancial distress and restructuring. But
even for this variable the e⁄ect is only signi￿cant after 1884.
Neither before nor after the reform in 1884 relative performance evaluation or long-
term ￿rm strategies play a role. The former we capture with mean dividend yield of
all banks in a given year, the latter we account for by including the average growth of
assets. This still holds true if we test for joint signi￿cance. Doing such a test for tenure
actually reveals that the single p-values are misleading in this case. Together￿ before
and after 1884￿ the parameter of the tenure variable are jointly signi￿cant below the 1%
level. Since tenure proxies age in our sample, this result re￿ ects that age in￿ uences the
6Table 2: Performance Turnover Relation, General Model
Model 1 Model 2
Coe¢ cient P-Value Coe¢ cient P-Value
Dividend Yield (DY) 0.111 0.088
DY*(t>1883) -0.219 0.010
Av. DY of a Manager (ADY) -0.087 0.366
ADY*(t>1883) 0.051 0.663
Mean DY at time t (MDY) 0.021 0.767
MDY*(t>1883) -0.234 0.095
1-Yr Share-Price Growth (DS) 0.965 0.100
DS*(t>1883) -1.866 0.023
Av. DS of a Manager (ADS) -0.852 0.561
ADS*(t>1883) 0.951 0.621
Av. Growth of Assets (AGR) -1.819 0.357 -2.025 0.327
AGR*(t>1883) 2.930 0.172 2.702 0.228
Tenure 0.024 0.398 0.061 0.098
Tenure*(t>1883) 0.000 0.998 -0.038 0.309
Number of Board Members 0.027 0.272 0.040 0.131
Total Assets -0.089 0.064 -0.069 0.168
Capital Reduction 0.252 0.437 0.249 0.487
Capital Reduction*(t>1883) 1.274 0.048 1.528 0.032
t>1883 0.951 0.100 0.441 0.242
constant -1.763 0.002 -2.160 0.000
Number of obs 2807 2473
LR ￿2 (18) / (13) 50.920 0.000 38.530 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.035
Log likelihood -591.04 -546.38
turnover of managers.
To reduce the estimation uncertainty we move from the general speci￿cation we
also tried a more speci￿c speci￿cation (Tables not reported for brevity but available
upon request) by removing all regressors that are insigni￿cant at the 10% level in both
model 1 and 2. Qualitatively the results remain unchanged. Finally, we also tried a
speci￿cation that splits the sample (again not reported for brevity) to allow for hetero-
scedastic errors in both sub-periods, before and after the reform. This speci￿cation
just con￿rmed our previous evidence: Before 1884 managerial turnover was virtually
una⁄ected by ￿rm performance, whereas afterwards short-run performance measures
(and ￿nancial distress) have an important in￿ uence on the turnover decision.
75 Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between performance and managerial turnover
for German banks in the late 19th and early 20th century. A period that covers a
substantial legal and instititutional reform, the "Actienrechtsnovelle" in 1884. This
reform introduced modern corporate governace institutions for joint-stock companies in
Germany.
We ￿nd, in contrast to other studies that compare managerial turnaover across dif-
ferent corporate governance systems of modern economies, substantial di⁄erences in the
performance turnover relationship. Before the reform, managerial leave was virtualy
unrelated to performance. After the reform performance signi￿cantly in￿ uences the
turnover of managers. In fact, this result is not all too much surprising, since the legal
standard suggested no direct control of managers by the shareholders. Manager were
supposed to act in the interest of "the ￿rm" itself but not to act in the interest of
the shareholder. This changed in 1884, and thereafter short-run performance became
important.
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